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Note
Beating the Odds: The Public Policy of Drug
Efficacy and Safety
Noah Lewellen*
Your scientist friend just inherited a fortune and is looking
to invest. Illiterate in finances and distrusting of bankers, he
decides to test local psychics to see which is skilled enough to
be entrusted with his investments. Being a scientist, he designed a test to determine the statistical significance of a psychic’s predictions: he flips a coin 200 times and asks the psychic
to call the flip. By random chance, the psychic should be right
1
about fifty percent of the time, or on about 100 flips. One psychic he found, however, was able to predict the coin toss on 114
2
flips, which, using a chi-square test, gives a p-value of 0.0477.
That means, your friend expounds excitedly, that he can be 95
percent confident that the psychic was using some ability—not
3
random chance—to predict the flip. He immediately delivers
his fortune into the care of the psychic’s financial wisdom.

* J.D. Candidate 2015, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2010,
University of Chicago. Thank you to Professor Fred Morrison for his advice
and guidance. Thank you also to my colleagues, the board and staff of Minnesota Law Review, for the great work they did to publish this Note. Finally,
thank you to my parents, Phil and Linda, for their constant support and love,
even when I ignored their wishes to become an engineer or a pastor and applied to law school. Copyright © 2015 by Noah Lewellen.
1. Kelly H. Zou et al., Revisiting the P-value: A Comparison of Statistical
Evidence in Clinical and Legal Medical Decision Making, 8 L. PROBABILITY &
RISK 159, 160 (2009).
2. This value is obtained by performing a chi-square test,
2
2
χ = Σ (observed value minus expected value) / (expected value), after determining the degrees of freedom in the experiment—in this case, 1—and apply2
ing the resulting χ value to a chi-square distribution table. For a brief
walkthrough on how to perform a chi-square test, including a chi-square distribution table, see Phillip McClean, The Chi-Square Test, N.D. ST. U. (2000),
http://www.ndsu.edu/pubweb/~mcclean/plsc431/mendel/mendel4.htm.
3. A p-value of 0.0477 indicates that one would expect a random guess
for each flip to result in 114 accurate “calls” out of 200 total to occur in roughly
4.77% of such trials (i.e., 0.0477*100). See Zou et al., supra note 1, at 160.
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Even once you understand the significance of the p-value
result, it is easy to criticize your friend’s decision. Aside from
the questionable transfer of skills at predicting coin flips to
predicting the stock market, his test suggests that the psychic
4
will be wrong roughly forty-three percent of the time. Even if
this misallocation of money never results in a loss—an unlikely
proposition—the fact that the investment resulted in no positive benefits means that your friend has missed opportunities
to gain money forty-three percent of the time.
If this seems nonsensical, it may be surprising to learn
that the p-value test is a critical benchmark for drug approval
by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in their efficacy
testing for drugs that treat anything from the common cold to
5
breast cancer. In the last couple of years, however, the use of
p-values in proving causation between drugs and their effects
has come under close scrutiny: the Supreme Court held in
6
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano that statistical significance, through p-value analysis, is not determinative in finding
7
causation between a drug and its side effects. In a recent
8
Ninth Circuit decision, United States v. Harkonen, the court
implied that p-values were determinative in linking a drug to
9
its positive benefits. These decisions are ostensibly in conflict
and thus cast doubt on the ubiquitous use of p-values as critical
benchmarks for drug approval and statistical significance in
the FDA’s drug approval process.
Part I of this Note sets forth the FDA’s current drug approval process, including its regulations and guidelines regarding p-values and statistical significance, and provides examples
of both approvals and rejections of drug applications. Part II
examines the tension between Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v.
Siracusano and United States v. Harkonen and analyzes how
the FDA’s drug approval process has affected courts’ decisions.
Part III contends that Matrixx and Harkonen can be reconciled
4. (86/200)*100 = 43% chance of being wrong.
5. See FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: PROVIDING CLINICAL EVIDENCE
OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR HUMAN DRUG AND BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS 12 (1998),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceCompliance
RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm078749.pdf (noting approval of a drug
based on a single study with a low p-value).
6. 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011).
7. See id. at 1319 (noting that other factors, not just a p-value, are considered when determining causation).
8. 510 F. App’x 633 (9th Cir. 2013).
9. See id. at 637–38; infra Part I.C.
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by framing statistical significance in the overall structure of
the FDA’s approval process regarding drug safety and efficacy.
This framework can be extended to cover new areas of food and
drug law, including the burgeoning field of personalized medicine, by proposing a balancing between statistical significance
and other important factors facing consumers. This Note concludes that statistical significance, while highly relevant in the
traditional efficacy context, is not as useful in examining the
safe use of drugs in uniquely-populated fields like personalized
medicine; it then details how courts might flexibly analyze such
situations using the FDA’s guidance and policy considerations
tacitly outlined in Harkonen and Matrixx.
I. HISTORY AND MODERN LANDSCAPE OF STATISTICAL
SIGNIFICANCE
The importance of statistical significance in the FDA’s decision-making processes must be placed in the context of its
historical and current purpose of protecting consumers. Section
A will briefly discuss the historical purpose of the FDA and the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). Section B will
provide a background on the FDCA’s requirements regarding
drug safety and efficacy. Sections C and D introduce Harkonen
and Matrixx, respectively, and provide background on how these cases seem to challenge the FDA’s current approach in using
statistical significance in safety and efficacy.
A. PURPOSE AND AUTHORITY OF THE FDA
The FDA was initially concerned solely with the safety of
10
drugs, not their effectiveness. The priorities of the FDA were
mostly based on ensuring uniformity in the production of
11
drugs. However, weak statutory language allowed numerous
12
ineffective or harmful drugs to come to market. This changed
with the 1962 amendments to the FDCA, which forced manufacturers to prove both the safety and effectiveness of their
13
products to the FDA for its approval. The FDA currently
claims responsibility “for protecting the public health by assuring the safety, efficacy and security of human . . . drugs [and]
10. Wallace F. Janssen, The Story of the Laws Behind the Labels, FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Overviews/ucm056044.htm
(last updated Mar. 11, 2014).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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for advancing the public health by helping to speed innovations
that make medicines more effective, safer, and more afforda14
ble.”
B. ACT REQUIREMENTS AND APPROVAL PROCESS
The FDCA requires drug manufacturers to show, through
“substantial evidence,” both the safety and efficacy of their pro15
posed drugs. The standard of evidence used is only vaguely
defined as
evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations . . .
by experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate
the effectiveness of the drug involved, on the basis of which it could
fairly and responsibly be concluded by such experts that the drug will
have the effect it purports or is represented to have under the condi16
tions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling.

In meeting this standard, manufacturers generally perform at
least two large-scale, controlled clinical trials to demonstrate
17
the safety and efficacy of the drug. These studies must follow
a variety of guidelines promulgated in FDA regulations generally establishing what an “adequate and well-controlled study”
18
entails.
14. What We Do, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/whatwedo (last updated Aug. 5, 2014).
15. FDA, supra note 5, at 2–3; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012) (stating
that the Secretary shall not approve a drug if there is a lack of substantial evidence proving efficacy or safety).
16. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). One notable exception to the vagueness of the approval or denial process is the strict Delaney Clause, which declares that no
additive may be deemed safe if it is found to cause cancer in humans or experimental animals. Janssen, supra note 10. While it is outside the scope of this
Note to discuss the Delaney Clause, it is worth noting that the Clause has
been rather liberally interpreted by the FDA to allow additives which cause
cancer in some circumstances, such as if those additives cause cancer only in
doses which no human would be likely to ever consume. See Richard A. Merrill, FDA’s Implementation of the Delaney Clause: Repudiation of Congressional Choice or Reasoned Adaptation to Scientific Progress?, 5 YALE J. ON REG.,
Winter 1988, at 6–7.
17. Anup Malani et al., Accounting for Heterogeneous Treatment Effects in
the FDA Approval Process, 67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 23, 27 (2012). The statute
also recognizes that sometimes one study, rather than two, may be acceptable
in showing substantial evidence. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). This is, however, disfavored by the FDA for a variety of reasons, including the higher risk of false
positives. FDA, supra note 5, at 4–5. Of the single studies that qualify, the
FDA notes that they should be, among other things, “particularly persuasive
(low p-value).” Id. at 12.
18. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b) (2014) (stating that studies, among other
items, should use a design that allows for comparison and that the method of
assigning patients to control groups should minimize bias).
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After submission of a manufacturer’s studies, reviewers
undertake analyses of those studies in order to make a recom19
mendation to approve or deny the new drug application. In a
reviewer’s analysis of efficacy claims made in a manufacturer’s
clinical study, nearly every aspect of the claim is reviewed with
statistical significance, in the form of a p-value, as a key de20
termining factor. The p-value is used extensively to uncover
study flaws based on, among other factors, study group compo21
sition. A finding that a study lacks the statistical significance
to show effectiveness, especially in conjunction with a finding
that serious adverse effects have been implicated, generally re22
sults in an application denial.
C. EFFECTIVENESS AND HARKONEN
Beyond study design, however, there are few hard-and-fast
rules as to what may constitute substantial evidence of effectiveness. The Act does not define “effectiveness,” and the Third
Circuit upheld the FDA’s interpretation that “statistical significance” is insufficient without substantial evidence of “therapeu23
tic effect.” Some authors have claimed that the FDA employs

19. See generally FDA, supra note 5 (providing guidance to the industry
on how to design a study to show clinical effectiveness for an effective NDA).
20. See, e.g., YUAN WHO CHEN, FDA, SBLA 103780/5010, STATISTICAL
REVIEW 8–12 (2003), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/Approval
Applications/TherapeuticBiologicApplications/ucm106184.pdf.
21. Id.; see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b)(4). This process is important because the FDA recognizes that studies are generally designed by manufacturers to achieve positive results. See FDA, supra note 5, at 4 (noting biases can
lead to false conclusions). Analyses such as these keep manufacturers from
hiding study manipulation behind acceptable efficacy ratings. See Malani et
al., supra note 17, at 25 (discussing how the FDA wishes to avoid manipulative data mining by drug companies).
22. See, e.g., ERIC BASTINGS, FDA, CLINICAL/CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY
AND BIOPHARMACEUTICS REVIEW FOR NDA 20-626, SE5-004 (2004), available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/
DevelopmentResources/UCM163202.pdf.
23. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1986). In
making this decision, the court cited several studies regarding Chymoral, the
drug in question. Id. One study relied on what the FDA found to be inappropriate post hoc stratification to show statistical significance. Id. It is important
to note, as the court did, that the Commissioner stated that “the most reliable
test of effectiveness is the comparison of the total drug group to the total placebo group.” Id. This test relies on statistical analysis and indicates that the
application may have been successful had there been a substantial effect
shown by unbiased statistical analysis. The second study the court discussed,
however, declared that, despite well-founded statistical significance in effect,
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other standards, such as an amorphic “clinical significance” for
24
prescription drugs. However, it is largely undisputed that the
FDA requires statistical significance to establish the basis of
25
scientific claims. Statistical significance at the very least pro26
vides some indication of effect, which is perhaps why the FDA
requires it as an indicator for drug approval. Lack of statistical
significance in a study comparing a drug to a control, however,
does not affirmatively indicate that there is no difference be27
tween the treatment and control. For example, in a study that
requires a p-value of 0.05 to find statistical significance, an
empirical finding of a p-value of 0.055 will not indicate said
significance, even though it is highly likely that the study
28
reached the result due to an effect outside of random chance.
Despite the fact that the lack of statistical significance does
not automatically indicate a lack of efficacy in drug studies, the
29
Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Harkonen indicates that a lack of statistical significance in a drug study is
enough to prohibit a manufacturer from advertising its drugs
30
as effective. In that case, Harkonen, a physician, researcher,
and former CEO of InterMune, Inc., was convicted of wire fraud
for issuing a press release touting the effectiveness of a new

the achieved effect was “therapeutically trivial,” and therefore ineffective for
its intended use. Id. at 156.
24. See Sarah M.R. Cravens, Note, The Usage and Meaning of “Clinical
Significance” in Drug-Related Litigation, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 553, 568
(2002) (noting that FDA approval cases are not clear about how to define significance).
25. Id. at 591.
26. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 14, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011)
(No. 09-1156) [hereinafter U.S. Brief] (“[S]tatistical significance provides some
indication about the validity of a correlation between a product and [an effect]
. . . .”).
27. See Brief of Amici Curiae Statistics Experts Professors Deirdre N.
McCloskey and Stephen T. Ziliak in Support of Respondents at 7–8, Matrixx,
131 S. Ct. 1309 (No. 09-1156) [hereinafter Brief for Statistics Experts]
(“[F]ailing to reject the null hypothesis does not mean that one should then
accept it.”).
28. Cf. id. at 8 (discussing how failing to reject the null hypothesis does
not automatically indicate a certain lack of causality). When one fails to reject
the null hypothesis, despite the existence of causation, this is known as a Type
II error, or a false negative. Id. at 9. This Note primarily discusses Type II errors.
29. 510 F. App’x 633 (9th Cir. 2013).
30. See id. at 637–38 (holding that evidence was sufficient to find a statement of efficacy misleading).
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31

prescription medication, Actimmune. The press release reported the preliminary results of a standard clinical trial which
showed that patients with idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis were
40 percent more likely to survive if taking Actimmune instead
32
of a placebo. Despite this appearance of effectiveness, the results were not statistically significant with regard to the
33
study’s pre-set endpoint: at 0.084, the p-value exceeded 0.05.
In its prosecution of Harkonen, the government contended that
the study merely suggested a survival benefit, but failed to af34
firmatively demonstrate one.
Harkonen’s press release contained such headlines as
“InterMune Announces Phase III Data Demonstrating Survival
35
Benefit of Actimmune in IPF,” and “Reduces Mortality by 70%
36
in Patients with Mild to Moderate Disease.” These announcements were made after two members of the FDA’s medical review staff—not acting for the Agency—informed Harkonen that
the data were inconclusive and insufficient for FDA approval to
37
treat IPF; they indicated further studies would be required.
Moreover, the p-value for the primary endpoint of the study
38
was 0.5. The government argued that the lack of statistical
significance for this preset endpoint meant that no one could
draw any conclusions from the trial and that any claim that
39
Actimmune had any survival benefit was “just false.”
In affirming Harkonen’s conviction of wire fraud, the Ninth
Circuit noted that such a conviction does not require a showing
that the defendant’s representations are universally considered
31. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1–2, Harkonen, 510 F. App’x 633 (9th
Cir. 2013) (No. 13–180).
32. Id. at 2.
33. Id. at 2, 5.
34. Id. at 2. It is interesting to note that the set endpoint of the clinical
trials discussed in Harkonen was not based purely on survival, but on “an approximately ten percent improvement in survival without progression in disease severity.” Id. at 5. The results for this endpoint were not statistically significant. Id.
35. IPF stands for idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis, a progressive lung disease. See What Is Idiopathic Pulmonary Fibrosis?, NAT’L HEART, LUNG &
BLOOD INST. (Sept. 20, 2011), http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/health-topics/
topics/ipf.
36. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 31, at 7.
37. Id. at 8, 10.
38. Id. at 9.
39. Id. at 10. For comparison, a p-value of 0.5034 in a coin-flipping experiment measuring the frequency of heads and tails for bias is generally considered to indicate a non-significant result and an unbiased coin. Zou et al., supra
note 1, at 160.
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40

false. The district court noted that a number of witnesses tes41
tified that the data demonstrated a survival benefit. In dismissing the relevance of this testimony, the court stated that it
could not acquit someone of fraud simply because other experts
in the field would have made similar misrepresentations given
42
the set of data presented. At the same time, the district court
found that a “‘p-value of 0.05 [was] somewhat of a magic number,’” and that results that report a p-value above it “‘are generally considered unreliable and [thus] not statistically signifi43
cant.’”
The government’s position in Harkonen was a stark change
from its stance in an amicus brief in Matrixx urging the Supreme Court to reject the theory that statistical significance de44
termines scientific truth. In fact, the Matrixx court agreed
with the government in that instance, contrasting the Ninth
45
Circuit’s findings in Harkonen.
D. SAFETY AND MATRIXX
Despite safety being held to the same substantial evidence
46
standard as efficacy by statute, in practice, the FDA has applied this standard much differently. Even the indication—even
if not statistically significant—of adverse effects may have a
47
bearing on a new drug application’s (NDA) denial. Adverse effects may manifest long after the conclusion of a clinical trial,
and statisticians have persuasively argued that statistical significance is an incomplete and anemic standard for determining

40. United States v. Harkonen, 510 F. App’x 633, 637 (9th Cir. 2013). In
fact, the court cited case law to show that fraud encompassed a variety of behavior, including any “‘dishonest method[] or scheme[],’ and any ‘trick, deceit,
chicane, or overreaching.’” Id. at 637 (quoting Carpenter v. United States, 484
U.S. 19, 27 (1987)). The court noted that the fraudulent nature of a defendant’s actions is measured by a non-technical standard. Id. (citing United
States v. Woods, 335 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2003)).
41. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 31, at 11.
42. Id.
43. Id. (quoting United States v. Harkonen, No. C 08–00164 MHP, 2010
WL 2985257, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 27, 2010)). The court apparently reached
this conclusion at the behest of other experts. See Harkonen, 2010 WL
2985257, at *5.
44. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 31, at 3.
45. See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1321–23
(2011) (holding that reports can be material despite lack of statistical significance).
46. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012).
47. See, e.g., BASTINGS, supra note 22, at 3.
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48

the relevancy of adverse effects. Indeed, the FDA’s own guidance documents reflect the understanding that the clinical tests
required for efficacy and safety testing generally lack the power
49
required to fully explore all potential adverse effects. This,
too, was the Solicitor General’s position in an amicus brief filed
50
in Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano.
Instead, the FDA endorses a more holistic approach, adopting factors such as association strength, temporal relationships
between adverse events and drug use, evidence of dose response, biological plausibility, and even the seriousness of the
51
effect in relation to the treated disease. The FDA has indicated that it may withdraw approval of a drug based on even the
52
suspicion of causation shown in post-market research.
In Matrixx, the Supreme Court found that Matrixx could
be liable to its investors for securities fraud stemming from its
lack of disclosure of reported adverse effects of its over-thecounter cold remedy, Zicam, even though the incidence of those
53
reported effects was not statistically significant. In doing so,
the Court affirmed a decision by the Ninth Circuit—the same
54
circuit that decided Harkonen.
Reports of adverse effects began to emerge around 1999,
when a neurologist called Matrixx after discovering a possible
55
link between Zicam and anosmia, a loss of smell. Other reports began to arrive, and Matrixx’s vice president for research
48. See Brief for Statistics Experts, supra note 27, at 21 (noting that factors such as sample size and lack of data may make calculating statistical significance “futile”).
49. See International Conference on Harmonisation; Guidance on Statistical Principles for Clinical Trials; Availability, 63 Fed. Reg. 49,583, 49,596
(Sept. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Harmonisation]. The FDA notes that p-values are
“sometimes useful” in safety analyses, but an approach that combines both
qualitative and quantitative approaches is preferred. Id.
50. See U.S. Brief, supra note 26, at 13 (“Statistical significance is a limited and non-exclusive tool for inferring causation[.]”).
51. See FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: GOOD PHARMACOVIGILANCE
PRACTICES AND PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGIC ASSESSMENT (2005), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatingInformation/Guidances/UCM126834
.pdf.
52. See FDA, THE CLINICAL IMPACT OF ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING 6–7
(1996),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Safety/MedWatch/
UCM168505.pdf; see also Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct.
1309, 1320 (2011).
53. Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1317–18.
54. Id. at 1314; United States v. Harkonen, 510 F. App’x 633, 633 (9th
Cir. 2013).
55. See Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1314.
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and development, Timothy Clarot, reached out to at least one
56
reporting doctor to discuss the effects. During one of these
phone calls, Clarot was informed about studies from the 1930s
57
and 1980s discussing zinc’s toxicity and ability to cause anos58
mia. Clarot also reached out to prevent a doctor from explicitly mentioning Zicam in a poster presentation to the American
Rhinologic Society which discussed patients’ resulting anosmia
59
after using the drug. At least two plaintiffs had sued Matrixx
for allegedly losing their smell due to Zicam use by the time
Matrixx made public statements claiming that they expected
60
revenues to be up by eighty percent in January 2004. This
was also in spite of Matrixx’s own report to the Securities and
Exchange Commission, which described a potential material
adverse effect which it expected could result in product liability
61
claims. On January 30, 2004, the FDA was reportedly looking
62
into complaints about anosmia resulting from Zicam use.
In a public statement responding to this report, Matrixx
announced that “‘the safety and efficacy of zinc gluconate for
the treatment of . . . the common cold have been well established in two double-blind, placebo-controlled, randomized clinical trials,’” that neither study had reported any adverse effects
of anosmia, and that the overall incidence of adverse effects as63
sociated with zinc gluconate was statistically insignificant.
Matrixx argued to the Court that the lack of statistical significance eliminated its responsibility to disclose adverse effects
64
reports to its investors. Matrixx’s claim “rest[ed] on the premise that statistical significance is the only reliable indication of
65
causation.” The government explicitly opposed this position,

56. See id.
57. Zicam’s active ingredient, zinc gluconate, used a zinc base. Id.
58. See id. at 1314–15.
59. Id. at 1315.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. Zicam was approved by the FDA for use under its guidelines regarding homeopathic treatments. See id. at 1316.
63. Id. at 1316
64. Id. at 1318–19. The Court noted that such a bright-line rule would artificially exclude information that a reasonable investor might use in making a
financial decision. See id. at 1319 (citing Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
236 (1988)).
65. Id. at 1319
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noting that experts, such as medical specialists, routinely “con66
sider multiple factors in assessing causation. . . .”
In affirming the Ninth Circuit’s decision that a claim of securities fraud against Matrixx could go forward, the Matrixx
decision noted that there are a number of ways both courts and
medical experts show causation outside of statistical signifi67
cance. The Court held that something more than statistical
significance in clinical trials must be considered when deciding
what to disclose to investors, suggesting that the source, con68
tent, and context of adverse reports may be relevant.
Harkonen, in his petition for certiorari, claimed that his
conviction by the Ninth Circuit directly conflicts with the Su69
preme Court and government in the Matrixx decision. In a
way, Harkonen is correct—the government and courts are
weighting p-values differently by holding statistical significance to be conclusive when deciding effectiveness and insufficiently conclusive when considering safety. Through these decisions, the government is beginning to shape the way statistical
significance should be used in drug manufacturing, marketing,
and post-market analysis.

66. U.S. Brief, supra note 26, at 8. Medical researchers, filing an independent brief, pointed out that some adverse effects, while undoubtedly linked
to a drug’s use, might occur so infrequently or with such subtlety that no researcher or manufacturer would likely be able to compile a dataset of appropriate quality or quantity. See Brief of Amici Curiae Medical Researchers in
Support of Respondents Urging Affirmance at 11, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v.
Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011) (No. 09-1156).
67. See Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1319–20.
68. Id. at 1321. The language involving examination of the context of reports bears a strong resemblance to the FDA’s approach to treating
postmarket reports of adverse effects. Compare Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1321,
with Harmonisation, supra note 49, at 49,596. Prior to the Matrixx decision, a
number of securities fraud cases with similar claims regarding statistically
insignificant adverse effects reports had been dismissed. See Joseph B.
Kadane, Matrixx v. Siracusano: What Do Courts Mean by ‘Statistical
Significance’?, 11 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 41, 42–44 (2011). While it is not within the scope of this Note to discuss the case history leading up to the Matrixx
decision, at least one author has come to the conclusion that Matrixx follows
that line of cases, but comes to a different conclusion only due to the strength
of the facts presented in the case. Id. at 46. This would indicate that, despite
previous decisions dismissing cases regarding statistically insignificant adverse facts, the courts have always espoused the idea that statistical significance is not the end-all, be-all of showing causation. See id. at 46–47.
69. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 31, at 26 (“The First
Amendment does not permit the government to prosecute a scientific viewpoint in one courtroom while championing that same viewpoint in another.”).
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II. THE FDA TREATS P-VALUES DIFFERENTLY FOR
DIFFERENT PURPOSES, AND THE FDA’S POLICY CHOICE
HAS EXTENDED INTO THE COURTS
While the decisions in Harkonen and Matrixx seem to cast
light on a conflict which requires the FDA’s attention, this Note
will demonstrate how the FDA’s policies regarding safety and
efficacy already support the reasoning inherent in those opinions. Section A describes how the FDA actually values statistical significance minimally when considering the safety of a
drug and poses some suggestions as to why this may be. Section
B contrasts this approach with the high value the FDA places
on statistical significance in the context of efficacy, and suggests the reasons behind that focus. Section C recognizes that
the FDA occasionally errs from the standard framework of
analysis set out in Part II and describes when that deviation
might occur.
A. STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE IS OF LITTLE IMPORTANCE WHEN
CONSIDERING THE SAFETY OF A DRUG
Statistical significance is less important to the FDA’s analysis of the safety of a drug than the mere fact that adverse effects occur after the administration of that drug. While not codified in regulation, this stance is reflected in the FDA’s
70
rampant use of other factors and their use of tests that are
71
generally frowned upon in proving the effectiveness of a drug.
The FDA and courts disregard stringent methods of linking adverse effects to product use because public policy dictates that
safety be paramount, both in restricting potentially noneffective drugs and in withdrawing potentially dangerous ones.
1. Current State of Statistical Significance in Safety Analyses
The FDA uses a number of factors outside of statistical
significance to assess the safety of a product, such as temporality between use and event, consistency across studies, evidence
of a dose-dependent response, biological plausibility, and seriousness of the side effect relative to the disease being treated,
72
among others. In analyzing these factors, the FDA approves a
drug sponsor’s data mining of its studies in order to further

70. See FDA, supra note 51, at 18.
71. See FDA, supra note 5, at 19.
72. See FDA, supra note 51, at 18.
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73

hone the precise nature of the safety risk. Such post hoc analyses are generally frowned upon in the drug approval process
due to risks of manufacturers mining data to achieve a higher
74
rate of success for their products.
In analyzing marketed drugs’ safety, the FDA may gather
information not only from manufacturers’ studies, but also
75
through its Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS). Reports made through FAERS may be submitted by doctors or
76
pharmacists, but may also be created by layperson consumers.
The FDA “does not require that a causal relationship between a
77
product and event be proven.” That being said, the FDA has
noted that “a temporal relationship between medical product
and adverse event [sic] . . . can make isolated reports conclusive
78
as to a product-event association.” The FDA uses these
FAERS reports to prescribe a variety of actions for a safety review of a drug, and, in some cases, may even use these reports
79
to remove a product from the market. Reported adverse effects
sometimes form part of the basis of a recommended denial for a
80
drug. The FDA’s broad and stringent requirements regarding
FAERS reporting reflects how little it relies on statistical significance when considering the post-market safety of a drug,
73. See id. at 17. The FDA has noted that post hoc surveillance of a drug
rarely results in a finding of causality between a drug and an adverse effect.
See FDA, supra note 52, at 7. Despite that statement, such surveillance may
produce a “prominent degree of suspicion,” which may be considered sufficient
for a regulatory decision. Id.
74. See FDA, supra note 5, at 19 (describing a report sufficient for drug
approval as being one that yields a consistent conclusion of efficacy without
using post hoc analyses); see also Malani et al., supra note 17, at 24 (suggesting that drug companies’ data mining results in too many false positives).
75. See FDA Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS), FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/
Surveillance/AdverseDrugEffects/default.htm (last updated Sept. 8, 2014).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. FDA, supra note 52, at 7.
79. See FDA Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS), supra note 75; see
also FDA, supra note 52, at 7.
80. See, e.g., BASTINGS, supra note 22, at 3. It is interesting to note that
the FDA Commissioner’s discretion to remove a drug from the marketplace
over safety concerns does not require that a lack of safety be shown in any
manufacturer’s study. See Fisher Bros. v. United States, 46 F.3d 279, 285–86
(3d Cir. 1995). In practice, recalls are rare, and involuntary recalls even rarer,
but statistical significance need not take an active role in a recall analysis. See
21 C.F.R. § 314.620(a) (2014) (describing requirements for a recall, including a
catchall of “[o]ther evidence [that] demonstrates that the drug product is not
shown to be safe or effective under its conditions of use”).
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and its weak reliance on such was explicitly acknowledged by
81
the government in Matrixx.
The Matrixx court held that the FDA’s position—that statistical significance is not dispositive in the relevance of adverse effects of a drug—was convincing and extended the rele82
vance of other factors into the world of securities fraud.
Foremost in the Court’s reasoning was that adverse reports
take many forms and that several factors the FDA considers in
issuing safety-related decisions were material in investors’ de83
cisions to involve themselves with a drug manufacturer. For
example, the Court noted that reports discussed a plausiblycausal link between Zicam and anosmia and that “[c]onsumers
likely would have viewed the risk associated with Zicam . . . as
84
substantially outweighing its benefit.” This bears a striking
resemblance to the FDA’s safety consideration involving the
“seriousness of the event relative to the disease being treat85
ed.” The Court also noted that it was important that Matrixx
had “ignored reports linking Zicam and anosmia and claimed
that zinc gluconate’s safety was well-established, when it had
86
evidence of a biological link between . . . zinc and anosmia.”
This, too, resembles the FDA’s consideration of “biologic plausi87
bility.” Both the FDA and the courts, then, appear to weigh
statistical significance similarly and similarly lightly when discussing a drug’s safety.
2. The Statistical Realities of Adverse Effects and Public
Concern for Safety Demand the Low Weight Afforded to
Statistical Significance by the FDA
Congress gave the FDA wide berth in authorizing it to re88
ject drugs based on questionable findings of safety. Safety and
public health have long been considered important government
81. See U.S. Brief, supra note 26, at 19 (“[The] FDA does not apply any
single metric for determining when additional inquiry or action is necessary,
and it certainly does not insist on ‘statistical significance.’”).
82. See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1313–14
(2011).
83. Id. at 1323.
84. Id.
85. See FDA, supra note 51, at 18.
86. See Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1323.
87. See FDA, supra note 51, at 18.
88. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(2), (d)(4) (2012) (stating that the Secretary may
reject a drug if its study fails to affirmatively demonstrate its safety or lacks
sufficient evidence to show its safety).
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interests deserving of special treatment under the law. Approving drugs for safe use should be policed just as strictly.
The most obvious and compelling reason for withdrawing
drug approval is the occurrence of a life-threatening illness associated with the drug’s use. In cases involving life-threatening
side effects, the FDA has not shied away from issuing public
90
health advisories based on a low number of complaints. In
many cases, this results in a voluntary withdrawal of the drug
91
from the market by its manufacturer.
Other than life-threatening illnesses, however, the FDA
has recognized a myriad of other reasons why a drug might un92
acceptably threaten public health. Zicam, the drug in Matrixx,
provides a prime example: Zicam was a cold remedy that potentially led to anosmia through a side effect of its main ingredi93
ent, which contained zinc. That is, it treated a low-danger illness with a drug that had the potential to cause a severe side
effect through a well-known biologically-indicated chemical
process. This does not comport with the FDA’s mission to protect consumers from unsafe drugs. This balance rapidly changes if Zicam had, for instance, been effective in fighting liver
cancer. The FDA satisfies its statutory goals by preventing the
loss of smell to consumers suffering from the common cold. On
the other hand, preventing consumers from treating their liver
cancer—even at the cost of their sense of smell—does not go
94
towards fulfilling those goals.
89. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199–200 (1976) (“Clearly, the
protection of public health and safety represents an important function of
state and local governments.”); cf. New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Drainage
Comm’n, 197 U.S. 453, 460 (“The drainage of a city in the interest of its public
health and welfare is one of the most important purposes for which the police
power can be exercised.”).
90. See, e.g., Press Release, FDA, FDA Statement on the Voluntary Withdrawal of Raptiva from the U.S. Market (Apr. 8, 2009), available at http://
www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm149561
.htm (issuing such an advisory after four patients using Raptiva for psoriasis
developed multifocal leukoencephalopathy, three of whom died).
91. See, e.g., id.
92. See, e.g., FDA, supra note 51, at 18.
93. See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1312
(2011).
94. The FDA’s guidance regarding safety analyses of a drug reflect this
balance. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. Its regulations regarding
whether or not to issue a recall, however, do not. See 21 C.F.R. § 7.41 (2014).
This lack seems like it would bias the FDA’s decision towards issuing a recall
of drugs the intended effects of which are far more beneficial than their side
effects are harmful, but the FDA’s initial safety determination has a great im-
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None of these reasons absolutely require the introduction
95
of statistical significance to the immediate analysis. Nor
should a formal statistical significance showing be required
when deciding whether a drug is unsafe, as such a requirement
would take time, potentially allowing more injuries to develop
from use of the drug. Statistical significance may, however, be
useful in adjusting the weight of certain factors in the balancing test the FDA already uses. For example, if the incidence of
a minor side effect, such as a migraine headache, were associated with a drug treating a minor illness, such as bronchitis,
formal testing involving statistical significance analysis may be
useful to help distinguish two things: a likelihood of causation
and a more accurate indication of the number of sufferers of the
side effect. Statistical significance does not, in and of itself,
96
prove causation, but researchers may reliably draw a strong
97
inference of causation from it. Even if significance is not
reached in the study, a more formal study may assist the FDA
in determining an approximate percentage of consumers who
would suffer from the side effect, as these statistics are often
98
skewed when only considering voluntary FAERS reports. In
these ways, statistical significance testing would assist the
FDA in determining how much weight to put behind the relatively low-level side effect of a migraine headache.
Critics have argued that forcing a company to report all
adverse events to its investors would be harmful to drug com99
panies and, in turn, consumers everywhere. It is easy to extrapolate this argument into the FDA regulatory realm by
claiming that rampant FDA regulation based on non-causative
reports would be detrimental to both drug companies and consumers. Requiring that drug developers only submit FAERS
pact on the decision as to whether to even consider a recall in the first place.
See id. § 7.40.
95. Presumably, statistical significance has been involved in the empirical
determination of zinc’s toxicity. However, no independent study with statistical significance regarding the toxicity of zinc gluconate (Zicam’s active ingredient) was required when the Matrixx court found that doctors’ warnings to
Matrixx regarding zinc’s toxicity were relevant to Matrixx’s treatment of that
information. See Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1314.
96. See Brief for Statistics Experts, supra note 27, at 19–21.
97. Id.
98. See FDA Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS), supra note 75.
99. See generally Brief for the Consumer Healthcare Products Association
and the Council for Responsible Nutrition as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011) (No. 091156).
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reports which have statistically significant causative connections would, however, ultimately harm drug companies and
consumers more. Such a requirement would force manufacturers to undertake preemptive tests to accurately determine the
statistical significance of an event, rather than simply flooding
the FDA with unsubstantiated reported adverse events. Manufacturers are already required to submit studies to show the
safety of their drugs, and the FDA may require studies on indi100
vidual populations. While this saves the FDA time and mon101
ey, it forces drug companies to bear that financial burden. In
the case of an unsafe drug, some companies may undergo expensive testing, only to have their studies show unacceptable
statistical significance of causation, resulting in regulatory action. Even in the case of manufacturers producing safe drugs
required to perform a targeted safety study, some risk-averse
manufacturers may decide to stop marketing their drug rather
than undergo a safety study and run the risk of forced withdrawal.
Dismissing the need for statistical significance to withdraw
a perceived unsafe drug is beneficial to both consumers and
manufacturers. The FDA currently employs a multifactor test
that is suitable in balancing concerns of causation and economy
with consumer safety. This “low bar” to agency regulation regarding the approval of drugs over safety concerns is reinforced
with the FDA’s stringent policies requiring substantial evidence of drug efficacy.
B. STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE IS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN
DETERMINING EFFICACY
While statistical significance is largely meaningless for the
FDA when examining a drug’s safety, it receives heavy scrutiny
when examining a drug’s efficacy. Such a policy is in keeping
with the FDA’s goal of protecting consumer’ safety by only allowing effective drugs to find their way into the marketplace.

100. See FDA, supra note 5, at 5 (discussing how a study may not be applicable to a certain population and would then require further studies targeting
that population).
101. See Charles L. Hooper, Pharmaceuticals: Economics and Regulation,
in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS (2d ed. 2008), available at
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PharmaceuticalsEconomicsandRegulation
.html (“The path through the FDA’s review process is slow and expensive. The
ten to fifteen years required to get a drug through the testing and approval
process leaves little remaining time on a twenty-year patent.”).
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1. Current State of Statistical Significance in Efficacy
Determinations
Drug applications live and die by their ability to show sta102
tistical significance in their efficacy. Drugs that are unable to
achieve the pre-set p-value of 0.05 that the FDA gives for sta103
tistical significance are generally rejected. Furthermore, the
FDA has set out rigorous testing guidelines and prohibited certain types of analysis in order to more stringently police which
104
drugs may be considered “effective” for their intended uses.
The Harkonen court put similar weight into its analysis of
the relevance of statistical significance to showing causation in
105
convicting Harkonen of fraud. Harkonen’s claims regarding
the effectiveness of his drug, Actimmune, came primarily from
106
sub-group post hoc analyses. The results from these types of
analyses are “notoriously unreliable” and, in most instances,
107
The
must be independently confirmed by a future trial.
102. See generally CHEN, supra note 20 (using p-values to support conclusions of differences between treatment groups and results in an approval recommendation).
103. Drugs that purport to benefit a niche population suffering from a serious illness are notable exceptions to this rule. The FDA has been somewhat
more flexible in allowing these drugs to come to market due to the lack of options relevant consumers have in those fields. FDA, PAVING THE WAY FOR
PERSONALIZED MEDICINE: FDA’S ROLE IN A NEW ERA OF MEDICAL PRODUCT
DEVELOPMENT 35 (Oct. 2013), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/PersonalizedMedicine/UCM372421.pdf.
This
has not, however, always been the case, and the FDA has been oft-criticized
for not being more flexible with its statistical requirements. See, e.g., Jay
Barnes, Perspective: The Right To Save Your Own Life, NEWS TRIBUNE (June
8, 2014) http://www.newstribune.com/news/2014/jun/08/perspective-right-saveyour-own-life (“While a stringent FDA approval process makes sense for nonlife- threatening diseases and widespread sale of new drugs, it defies logic to
forbid Americans who are about to die from taking drugs that might work.”);
Erica Teichert, FDA Clinical Trials Need More Flexibility, Lawmakers Say,
LAW360 (July 9, 2014, 2:15 PM ET), http://www.law360.com/articles/555714/
fda-clinical-trials-need-more-flexibility-lawmakers-say (indicating that Congress wants the FDA to “allow alternative trial designs and emerging technologies to gain traction”).
104. See FDA, supra note 5, at 19 (stating that robust results should require no post hoc analysis).
105. See generally United States v. Harkonen, 510 F. App’x 633 (9th Cir.
2013). Despite what the petition for certiorari seems to imply, the court did
not go so far as to say Harkonen definitely failed to establish causation, but
that his press release was overreaching in its claims of effectiveness. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 31, at 9–10; see generally Harkonen, 510
F. App’x 633.
106. See Harkonen, 510 F. App’x at 636.
107. United States v. Harkonen, No. C 08–00164 MHP, 2010 WL 2985257,
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Harkonen court did not address what level of proof was required to support Harkonen’s claim that his drug was effective
for its intended use, but the government argued that the
study’s only meaningful p-value was for the primary endpoint,
that the p-value was 0.5, and that such a value meant that “you
108
can’t draw any conclusions from this trial.” The government’s
position, then, is clearly spelled out: p-values are essential for
finding causation in efficacy studies.
2. The Public Interest of Safety Extends to Efficacy and
Demands a Strict Standard of Statistical Significance To Show
Causation
The history of the FDA as an agency and the legislative
history of the FDCA both indicate that Congress had the safety
of consumers in mind when it gave the FDA the power to regu109
late drugs based on their effectiveness. Congress recognized
that no drug is truly safe unless it is also effective in its intend110
ed use. Indeed, the opportunity cost of using a drug that purports to have a certain effect but is not effective would be the
continuance, and possible worsening, of a disease.
Requiring a finding of efficacy, then, is similar to requiring
relatively low levels of severity of side effects for a drug. Unlike
in safety findings, however, there are few ways of inferring
111
causation for efficacy outside of controlled studies. One proposed method was to allow anecdotal evidence from physicians
who regularly prescribed the drugs in question, but the hearings underlying the 1962 amendments to the FDCA marked a
112
concern that impressions of physicians are “treacherous.”
at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 27, 2010). Further damning for Harkonen, in the court’s
eyes, was that he stated he would “‘cut that data and slice it until [he] got the
kind of results [he was] looking for.’” Harkonen, 510 F. App’x at 636. The ability to “cut and slice” like this via post hoc analyses is exactly the kind of data
manipulation the FDA seeks to avoid by prohibiting such data mining.
108. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 31, at 9. The Harkonen
court declined to opine on this reasoning, presumably to avoid giving
Harkonen any argument in its petition, which relies partly on McAnnulty to
say that the court should not convict someone of fraud who communicates scientifically debatable facts. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 31, at
10. See generally Harkonen, 510 F. App’x 633.
109. See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text.
110. See Janssen, supra note 10.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 75–81. The reporting system is not
used for pre-market approval of drugs. See FDA Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS), supra note 75.
112. Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, 412 U.S. 609, 619 (1973).
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Thus, anecdotal evidence, such as the FAERS reports in the
context of safety, cannot carry significant weight in an efficacy
analysis. This stance makes sense, as it creates perverse goals
for manufacturers to incentivize physicians and consumers to
113
report their positive results from using a drug.
114
Other factors the FDA relies upon for safety analyses also make little sense in the efficacy context. For instance, biologic plausibility is generally assumed, given the manufacturer researched and designed a drug to meet demand for a particular
115
disease. Evidence of a dose response is largely irrelevant, un116
til the drug has the effect it purports to have. Statistical significance tests have built-in endpoints, allowing such studies to
117
effectively infer causation for claimed effects.
For a finding of “efficacy,” both a useful effect and a strong
118
inference of causation must be established. These tests cost
manufacturers—and thus, consumers—money, and prevent
119
useful drugs from coming to the market quickly, but attempt
113. Sometimes, the FDA does take consumers’ reports of effectiveness into
account when deciding whether to roll back a full recall for a select group of
consumers, but such an action is rare and is accompanied by further testing.
See, e.g., Letter Regarding Lotronex from Janet Woodcock, Dir., Ctr. for Drug
Evaluation & Research (Dec. 18, 2000), available at http://www.fda.gov/
Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders
/ucm110883.htm.
114. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
115. Two likely exceptions come to mind. One is where a drug is developed
for one use, such as pain relief, but frequently used for another use, such as
lowering blood pressure (e.g., aspirin). In this situation, known as “off-label”
use, a drug company must go through an additional round of testing for the
new intended use if it wishes to market the drug in the new way. See “OffLabel” and Investigational Use of Marketed Drugs, Biologics, and Medical Devices – Information Sheet, FDA (June 25, 2014), http://www.fda.gov/
RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm126486.htm. Another situation in
which the manufacturer may not know of a biologically plausible mechanism
by which the drug functions is that in which the drug has been fraudulently
developed without adequate scientific research and is actually ineffective. In
both of these situations, the well-controlled testing requirements set by the
FDA prevents a drug whose biological plausibility is in doubt from release
without further testing.
116. For instance, it is certainly possible for a drug to have an effect that is
“clinically insignificant.” See Cravens, supra note 24, at 593 n.179. A drug’s
dosage response may show some causation, but that causation is irrelevant
until it has a meaningful effect. Id.
117. See Ronald A. Thisted, What Is a P-Value? 5–6 (June 8, 1998) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://galton.uchicago.edu/~thisted/
Distribute/pvalue.pdf.
118. See supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text.
119. See Hooper, supra note 101 (discussing how the FDA’s evidentiary re-
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to ensure consumers’ safety. The FDA currently requires a p120
value of 0.05 for efficacy studies of new drugs. That value is
something of a “magical standard” that attempts to balance
consumers’ interests in prohibiting drugs that cannot pass a
safe threshold with the reality that absolute causation is impossible to prove without achieving an unrealistic p-value of ze121
ro.
C. THE EFFICIENCY OF A QUICK DRUG APPROVAL IS SOMETIMES
MORE IMPORTANT THAN ESTABLISHING A STRONG INFERENCE OF
CAUSATION
One of the factors that the FDA takes into account when
assessing the safety of a drug is the “degree of benefit the prod122
uct provides, including availability of other therapies.” When
other therapies are unavailable, statistical significance testing
may not be as crucial in the approval of a drug. For example, in
the case of a drug which purports to cure a life-threatening disease for which there is no other treatment, a study reporting a
p-value of 0.06, above the limit set by the FDA, should not be
fatal to the drug’s approval. In this case, the possibility that the
drug would help the affected population outweighs the possibility that it might have no effect, as the alternative is that the affected population would have no treatment whatsoever.
Allowing such drugs to go to market without any statistical
significance testing should, however, remain forbidden. Such a
policy would incentivize “gold rushes” to niche markets for drug
manufacturers, as the second-place manufacturers would be
required to undergo testing while the first drug was marketed.
This policy has obvious perverse incentives, including the release of a fraudulent drug that purports to have an effect with
no reliable documentation of such an effect. Even for individuals with no other hopeful drugs, profiteering off of a miserable
man’s vain hopes of treatment is morally abhorrent and should
be prohibited if there is no reason to believe a drug would have
any effect. Furthermore, dropping any and all significance testing requirement would force ill consumers to do extensive requirements for new drug approvals may take a sponsor a decade to achieve
and cost waiting consumers their lives).
120. In re Nuvelo, Inc. Secs. Litig., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98441, at *35
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2008).
121. Cf. id. at 35–36 (discussing how this value is allowed for two studies
on the same drug, but how a lower p-value is required for a single study because of the lack of repetition in testing).
122. See FDA, supra note 51, at 18.
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search in a flood of near-useless drugs to find the least-useless
one—an expenditure of time, money, and opportunity of which
123
a terminally ill patient has little.
Requiring p-value testing at all slows the marketing approval process, though removing it completely would be unacceptable. Allowing higher p-values in single studies would aid
in the speed with which a drug might be released while keeping
some standards by which the FDA could judge the efficacy of a
drug.
III. POLICY CONCERNS DICTATE THAT P-VALUES
SHOULD BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY IN DIFFERENT
CONTEXTS
This Note has discussed the conflict that seems to arise
from the opinions in Harkonen and Matrixx. It next analyzed
the policy decisions that the FDA makes regarding safety and
efficacy with regards to statistical significance. Next, in Section
A, this Note compares the reasoning in Harkonnen and Matrixx
with the policy decisions the FDA has made regarding statistical significance and concludes that the courts have essentially
adopted the FDA’s reasoning, although couched in other arguments. Thus, while arguments rage over whether the Matrixx
124
court or the Harkonnen court got it right, such arguments are
misplaced because the courts are in accordance. In Section B,
this Note forwards one field—personalized medicine—as one in
which the FDA should explicitly discuss its policies regarding
p-values and safety and efficacy. In Section C, this Note discusses the methods by which the FDA might promulgate its
stance and the dangers in taking such a stance. The Note concludes in Section D by offering courts presumptions to hold in
cases similar to those of Harkonen and Matrixx that focus on
protecting public safety.

123. See Kathleen Doheny, Fake Malaria Drugs Thwart Global Efforts To
Treat Dangerous Diseases, TAKEPART (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.takepart
.com/article/2012/09/25/counterfeit-medications-thwart-global-efforts-treat
-dangerous-diseases (discussing how fake drugs with no testing requirements
may contain some useful, active ingredients but ultimately harm consumers).
124. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 31, at 1–2; see also Nathan A. Schachtman, The Matrixx Motion in U.S. v. Harkonen (Dec. 17, 2012),
http://schachtmanlaw.com/the-matrixx-motion-in-u-s-v-harkonen.
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A. MATRIXX AND HARKONEN STAND FOR TWO SIDES OF THE
SAME COIN
The issue in Matrixx was whether or not Matrixx had
125
made statements that were misleading as to material facts.
The Supreme Court in Matrixx first considered the merits of
Matrixx’s contention that “adverse event reports that do not reveal a statistically significant increased risk of adverse effects
126
from product use are not material information.” Relying on
experts’ opinions, including the FDA’s, the Court focused on the
broad nature of information the FDA considers relevant and
the lower standards with which the FDA treats causality and
127
statistical significance in post-market surveillance. The Court
stopped short of requiring that all adverse events reported to a
128
company be disclosed to investors, but noted that the type of
information that Matrixx received should have tipped it off to a
129
change in the “total mix” of information provided to it.
The Matrixx Court found that this “total mix” was shifted
because of reports from “more than 10” patients who had lost
their smell from three medical professionals and researchers
and due to Matrixx’s knowledge of a presentation made at a
medical conference about a potential causal link between Zicam
130
and anosmia. The Court noted that that presentation included a case study which suggested “a temporal relationship be131
tween Zicam use and anosmia.”
The Matrixx Court relied heavily on the criteria that the
FDA uses in conjunction with the FAERS system to investigate
potentially harmful drugs. The Court, as well as the FDA,
looked to the number of similar complaints of the same side effects (i.e., consistency across reports) as well as other numerous
factors, including the temporality of the drug use and implicat132
ed side effects.

125. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2011).
126. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
127. See id. at 1320.
128. See id. at 1321.
129. Id. at 1322.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. These criteria cited by the court are similar to those given by the FDA
as considerations when looking at the safety of a drug. See FDA, supra note 51
at 6–7.
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The court in Harkonen focused on the materiality of evi133
dence regarding not safety and side effects, but efficacy. The
court found against Harkonen based mainly on his knowledge
of the likelihood of his drug’s rejection, his willingness to manipulate data to get the results he wanted, and InterMune’s biostatistics expert’s testimony that the company overstated the
134
conclusiveness of the results. While the court did not explicitly rely on the FDA’s statistical significance standards for drug
approval regarding efficacy, it was swayed by Harkonen’s behavior, especially when he said that he wanted to take the data
from the drug study and cut and slice it until he got the results
135
(the p-value) he was looking for. The FDA’s requirement for
statistical significance seems to have been the driving factor for
Harkonen’s behavior.
Because this was a jury trial, we may never know what the
tipping point of the testimony was, but it is clear from the record that the jury heard testimony from Intermune’s researchers
stating that “[t]he indices didn’t show any difference whatsoever, and the p-values were very high showing no evidence what136
soever.” That researcher also informed Harkonen that they
“had no evidence of an effect on the primary efficacy end137
point.” The researcher suggested further tests to follow up on
138
a post hoc analysis that showed possible survival benefits.
Thus, some evidence (i.e., post hoc analysis) existed to show the
glimmer of some benefits. The FDA, however, does not support
the use of post hoc analysis in efficacy testing, as it is inherent139
ly unreliable. When Harkonen represented this glimmer of
success in survival benefits as being supported by data, then,
140
the jury found him guilty of fraud. This strict reliance on reliable statistical significance by the jury, upheld by the Ninth
Circuit, mirrors the FDA’s approach to efficacy and statistical
significance.
Harkonen and Matrixx both represent the FDA’s and our
society’s views that, as matters of public policy, efficacy should
133. See United States v. Harkonen, 510 F. App’x 633, 636–37 (9th Cir.
2013).
134. Id. at 637–38.
135. Id. at 636.
136. United States v. Harkonen, No. C 08–00164 MHP, 2010 WL 2985257,
at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 27, 2010).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See FDA, supra note 5, at 19.
140. Harkonen, 510 F. App’x at 636–37.
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be held to a stricter standard to show causality (requiring statistical significance), while a showing of a product’s danger
(imputing its safety) may be satisfied with far less evidence.
These decisions reflect the view that the safety of a consumer is
paramount in drug transactions. The cases are not at odds, but
rather are pointing to the same conclusion: companies face a
high burden when bringing drugs to market, as there is a presumption of inefficacy in place to protect consumers; and companies face a high burden once deleterious effects have been
linked to their product, as there is a presumption of causation
that companies must disprove. The Supreme Court seems to
agree that no further interpretation is needed, as Harkonen’s
141
petition for certiorari was recently denied.
With that in mind, both the FDA and society at large recognize times when these standards should be bent. As discussed above, for instance, the FDA has recognized that consumer demand for potentially unsafe, potentially ineffective
drugs may be justified in situations where there is no other
142
hope. What about other scenarios when, for example, statistical significance testing may be next to impossible, or post hoc
analysis is the only kind of analysis available?
B. STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE SHOULD BE WEIGHTED LIGHTLY
IN THE APPROVAL OF PERSONALIZED MEDICINE
Personalized medicine is an up-and-coming field of treatment in which drugs are narrowly tailored to specific popula143
tions, or even individuals. For example, one drug might aim
at reducing blood pressure in only African-American diabetic
patients because it targets a specific characteristic unique to
that population. The ultimate aim of personalized medicine is
to create treatment plans unique to an individual, tailoring a
drug and its dosage not just to the disease, but to the disease
144
and patient.
The problem with requiring a showing of statistical significance for approval in such scenarios lies in the target populations’ small sample sizes. The FDA has warned that tests with
small sample sizes often lack the power to show significant clin145
ical effect. As treatments shift to the individual level, it be141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Harkonen v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 824 (2013) (mem.).
See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
See FDA, supra note 103, at 2.
See id.
Id. at 34.
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comes impossible for drug companies to design studies that
may predict effectiveness in a patient—instead of extrapolating
those effects from other studies—without testing each individ146
ual.
Individualized medicine, then, marks a boundary at which
statistical significance is no longer useful in the way that the
147
FDA currently uses it to approve drugs. For the purposes of
individualized medicine, post hoc analyses currently not allowed in approval of drugs may be useful in approving personalized drugs, simply because there is little to no other option to
establish statistical significance.
While post hoc analyses are in danger of abuse by manufacturers, this policy concern is greatly lessened in the sphere
of personalized medicine because of the great differential in potential profits a company may recoup from a personalized med148
icine approval. For example, a late-stage pancreatic cancer
medicine that is found to be ineffective to the population at
large but is found to be effective in a post hoc analysis for 0.5
percent of the population which carries a certain recessive genetic trait should probably be approved for that sub-group. The
manufacturer’s incentive to manipulate the data may still be
present, but the reward, being much smaller, makes doing so
less tempting. That analysis, when considered with other factors like the availability of other effective medicine and the severity of the illness, should take priority in approving individualized medicine.
C. GUIDANCE: ADVANTAGES AND PITFALLS
Issuing a guidance document to delineate the purpose of pvalues may, at first, seem like an attractive proposition. The
FDA regularly issues guidance documents to aid drug and de149
vice developers in conforming to the FDA’s requirements. In
such documents, however, the FDA has been careful not to deal
in absolutes when discussing the use of p-values in determining
146. Id. at 30.
147. The approval process generally is not particularly useful for personalized medicine, which, by its nature, produces drugs that require approval only
once an individual requires them; a near-record time for approval is roughly
3.6 months. Id. at 35. Despite that, it is clear that some sort of approval process is still necessary. See Doheny, supra note 123.
148. Cf. FDA, supra note 103, at 2 (discussing how personalized medicine
markets to a small population or to an individual).
149. See generally Clinical Trials Guidance Documents, FDA (Dec. 24,
2014), http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm122046.htm.
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151

drug safety and efficacy. This inclusive approach comports
with its stance on safety, but seems to run afoul of its seemingly religious adhesion to statistical significance in showing efficacy. Instead of providing bright-line rules for the use of pvalues in efficacy, which would doubtlessly be useful for the efficiency of the drug approval system, the FDA has historically
152
elected to be flexible in its approach.
1. Safety Above All Else
The FDA has openly stated that p-values may sometimes
be valueless in the determination of a drug’s safety: in its guidance on statistical principles, the Agency determined that pvalues may oftentimes be considerably imprecise when dealing
with low-frequency occurrences, such as in the context of side
153
effects. At the same time, the FDA states that p-values can be
useful in evaluating safety claims, particularly with large
154
amounts of laboratory data.
What the Agency’s guidance does not state is as important
as what it does. For example, while the guidance discusses how
to treat p-values—useful or useless, depending on the situation—it does not discuss all the methods of identifying safety
problems with a developing drug, though it does try to provide
helpful hints to researchers seeking to construct an informative
155
trial. This all-inclusive approach in its guidance is consistent
with the FDA’s overall approach to safety.
2. Efficacy and Flexibility
On the other hand, the lack of firm guidance with regards
to statistical significance and efficacy is, at first, more difficult
to explain. While the FDA normally requires two “adequate and
156
well-controlled individual trials,” it has noted a number of exceptions that may allow a single drug study to support an effec150. See Harmonisation, supra note 49, at 49,596.
151. Cf. FDA supra note 5, at 15 (noting that while a “statistically very
persuasive finding” may be enough to allow for a single trial, rather than the
standard double trial, such findings have occasionally been shown to be false
positives).
152. See id. at 3 (“[The] FDA has been flexible within the limits imposed by
the congressional scheme, broadly interpreting the statutory requirements to
the extent possible where the data on a particular drug were convincing.”).
153. See Harmonisation, supra note 49, at 49,596.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 49,595–96.
156. Id.
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157

tiveness claim. While one of these exceptions is a particularly
persuasive p-value, it is crucial to note that the “Agency has
not comprehensively described the situations in which a single
adequate and well-controlled study might be considered adequate support for an effectiveness claim,” and that not all of the
158
exceptions include a persuasive p-value. The FDA recognizes
that, while statistical significance is an exceptionally useful argument for a drug’s efficacy in a single trial, rather than a double, it need not be a necessity in a drug’s approval. Statistical
significance remains, for the most part, a de facto requirement,
159
even if not de jure.
As discussed above, the FDA has already begun to enunci160
ate flexible standards with regards to personalized medicine.
The FDA’s firm practical stance on requiring statistical significance for drug testing has been effective in screening potentially ineffective drugs from the market, but its loose guidelines
have allowed it to react dynamically to advancements of science
and the dawn of the age of personalized medicine. Calcifying
the Agency’s official stance on p-values with regards to efficacy
may stifle further scientific development.
D. JUDICIAL TAKEAWAY AND PRESUMPTIONS OF SIGNIFICANCE
Courts should be encouraged to look at the public policy
behind the FDA’s decisions to treat statistical significance as it
does—nearly a necessity in the realm of efficacy, barring some
extraordinary circumstances; and as useful, but not dispositive
in the realm of safety. Clear guidance from the FDA regarding
statistical significance and claims of a drug’s efficacy is not
available, nor will it likely be forthcoming due to concerns over
the FDA’s flexibility in dealing with future drug development
advances. Guidance from the FDA regarding which factors, including p-values, may be dispositive in showing a safety concern will necessarily be vague so as to allow flexibility in finding flaws in treatments through a variety of pathways.
Through its decisions and guidance regarding statistical significance in clinical drug trials, however, the FDA has focused on
a central public policy goal that courts ought to notice: safety of
drugs is paramount.

157.
158.
159.
160.

FDA, supra note 5, at 13–15.
Id. at 12.
See supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text.
See supra note 103; Part III.B.
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As such, the courts should favor public safety by adopting
presumptions against the safety and efficacy of drugs. If a
drug’s efficacy is challenged, it should face the high bar of statistical significance currently—if not explicitly—adopted in
FDA policy. If a drug’s safety is challenged, it should face a
similarly high bar of disproving the allegations of harm, or else
be forced to disclose those allegations. These presumptions favoring public safety are inherent in the conclusions drawn by
the Matrixx and Harkonen courts and should be used expansively, especially now that the Supreme Court has declined to
comment on the supposed “discord.” Some exceptions will certainly arise, such as in the case of personalized medicine, where
stringent bars regarding statistical significance may be nigh
impossible to overcome. In such cases, courts should look to
balance consumers’ concerns, such as the lack of alternative
treatments for their illnesses, against the threat to their safety,
and lower the requisite causative bar accordingly.
Developers of drugs like Actimmune should not be allowed
to tell their investors that the drug is effective if the undoctored
p-value shows a lack of statistical significance. A lack of statistical significance indicates a lack of efficacy and, thus, an unsafe investment of time and effort for both the investor and the
consumer. Developers of drugs like Zicam should not be allowed
to leave objectively credible reports that their drug is harming
their consumers unreported, even if those events constitute low
statistical significance, because a sure showing of causation is
of secondary concern in a situation where consumers are being
harmed. An analysis similar to that which the FDA undertakes
161
162
for safety concerns or for efficacy is appropriate in the presence of extraordinary factors. Such analyses should be relatively simple for courts to perform in cases replete with experts in
statistics and drug development.
CONCLUSION
The courts in Matrixx and Harkonen treated statistical
significance differently because of the different contexts in
which each was presented: Matrixx presented an issue of safety
and Harkonen one of efficacy. The FDA treats statistical significance with similar context-sensitivity, though it does so implicitly. In the context of safety, statistical significance is relatively
161. See FDA, supra note 51, at 18.
162. See supra Part II.B.
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unimportant to the goal of preventing dangerous drugs from
entering and remaining on the market, as adverse effects
caused by the drug may often manifest at statisticallyinsignificant but extremely personally-significant levels. In the
context of efficacy, statistical significance is of utmost importance because it provides a barrier over which only probably-effective drugs are allowed; stringent statistical cutoffs are
required to fulfill the goal of safety and reduce opportunity
costs for consumers.
Although statistical significance may play a role in any approval, the FDA uses a flexible approval process for the burgeoning field of personalized medicine, where large sample sizes—and, thus, reliable tests for statistical significance—are
impossible. The Agency instead allows responsible post hoc data analysis to serve as acceptable showings of statistical significance for drugs. Courts should follow the FDA’s lead in showing
flexibility in determining the importance of statistical significance where a showing of such would be impossible. In applying any balancing test, however, courts should keep in mind
that public safety is, and should be, the government’s primary
concern in regulating drugs.

